When faced with replacement threat, incumbent managers can look for support from employees to keep their position, by investing in an employee-friendly relationship. Enjoying such relationship, employees will help managers to preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. Interestingly, I find that when the benefits from the close relationship are large enough compared with the difference in managers' ability, shareholders' welfare increases with the investment in relationship and they prefer to share part of their power on the firm with employees. When considering industrial characteristics, shareholders, from industries where human capital is more important than physical assets, are more willing to share the power and managers are more willing to invest in the employee close relationship than those from the industries with less human capital importance.
Introduction
Early in 1932, Adolph Berle and Gariner Means mentioned the problem of the separation of ownership and control in the firm in "The Modern Corporation and Private Property", establishing the initial point of the debate in corporate governance. With the separation of ownership and control, the firm's owner (shareholders) and the firm's controller (managers) can have conflicting interests. 1 The standard definition of corporate governance among economists and legal scholars is the defense of shareholders' interests (Tirole, 2001 ).
In the last thirty years, the study in corporate governance was focused on solving conflicts between shareholders and managers, and the incongruent interests between large shareholders and small shareholders of the firms (Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2002) . Although there are plenty of studies in the field of corporate governance and despite the implementation of regulations such as OECD 1999 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, corporate scandals continue to exist. This implies that the research in corporate governance field is far from satisfactory. According to Zingales (2000) and Child (2003) , corporations are undergoing important transformations. Firms have become more complex in organization structures and human capital becomes more important as compared with thirty years ago. Therefore, just solving the conflicts between shareholders and managers is not enough. In addition to shareholders, stakeholders' welfare also needs to be considered (Tirole, 2001 ). Employees, important stakeholders of the firm, are the focus of this paper.
The importance of the employees, especially the talented employees, to a firm is becoming more clear nowadays. In the Second Meeting with SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises), organized by Banco Gallego and Expansión in Spain of 2007, the experts find that a firm's competitive advantages are not just about the money or the investment in R&D. Now the commitment of talented professionals aligned with the corporate strategy is the best asset of a company. With a shortage of talented professionals in the labor market, qualified employees can choose where, how and with whom they want to work. Employees not only care about the monetary payment, but they also want to participate in making corporations' decisions.
2 Thus, it is natural to ask whether the important role played by the employees can help mitigate problems in corporate governance. Moreover, managers in the firm have a closer relationship with employees than the one shareholders may have. Together with the importance of the employees in the firm, it gives the managers a special motivation to entrench themselves to a friendly relationship with workers, to get their support when faced with replacement threats. There does exist real world cases in which employees try to protest for their favorite managers. Wierton Steel, is an example of a company that did extremely well at first, ahead of its peers. But the board replaced the CEO, a favorite of employees, with an outsider, a mutual-fund executive. A worker group then was organized and filed a shareholder suit accusing the officers and directors of their mismanagement (Monks and Minow, 2004) .
Given the real world observations and with very few papers studying the employees-manager relationship in corporate governance, I try to find out in this paper whether one can mitigate the conflicts between shareholders and managers by taking into account the relationship between managers and employees.
To answer the question, I propose a simple model in which the incumbent manager is faced with competition from an outside managers' market for his job position. There is a shareholder-owned firm, while employee's influence on shareholder's decision is considered. The shareholder has the right to make decisions on the manager replacement, but the employee can influence the replacement results by protesting against the shareholder at a cost. The employee protest for the incumbent manager by negotiating and voting on the board of directors, or through the Labor Union. Therefore, how successful the protesting is depends on employee's influential power, which is determined by the shareholder.
The incumbent manager can choose to invest in an employee-friendly relationship. The close relationship considered does not include money collusions between the incumbent manager and the employee, i.e. the incumbent manager cannot get employee's support by neither giving them money compensation, promotion benefits or other actions related to bribing, nor by monitoring less on employee's working effort. One good example of the close relationship between the incumbent manager and the employee can be an investment in an Employee Relationship Management program (ERM). It is a system of tools such as strengthening corporate communication and culture, fieles" ("Clever employees... and very faithful").
establishing new communication channels and organizing more open talks between employers and employees, targeting information to employees based on their interests and needs, reducing information searching time, reducing turnover and retaining talented employees, reducing recruitment and training costs, etc.
3 Therefore, the investment in the close relationship helps to reduce employee's working costs. However, the incumbent manager invests in the employee-friendly relationship at a cost, because he may put some efforts in the investment. With this close relationship, the employee is more willing to work for the incumbent manager and does not want the manager to be replaced by a new manager, even if the latter has higher working ability. He decides on whether to protest or not by trading off the less talented manager against the benefits from the relationship. I investigate questions like when it is optimal for the shareholder to give some influential power to the employee; what factors will influence incumbent manager's decision on investing in the close relationship; benefiting from incumbent manager's investment in relationship, whether the employee will protest or not; if he protests, to which extent the employee would like to protest; what will influence incumbent manager's and employee's decisions, etc.
With this framework, I get the following results: First, the shareholder is willing to share her power with the employee in some circumstances. Actually the shareholder benefits from the close relationship between the incumbent manager and the employee, because with the relationship, employee's working costs are reduced and he is willing to put more working effort. Hence, if the reduction in the working costs can cover the difference between the managers' ability, it is optimal for the shareholder to give the employee part of her power of the firm. Second, observing that the employee has some influential power, the incumbent manager does invest in the relationship expecting future employee protesting. He is more willing to invest in the close relationship if the private benefits of working as a manager in the firm is greater, if the probability of being replaced is higher and if the protesting succeeds with a higher probability. Third, the employee will not protest if the incumbent manager is very inefficient compared with the outside manager or his own influential power is very low. Thus, the very inefficient manager cannot stay at the firm. In addition, employee's protesting decision depends on the investment level and the benefits from the close relationship. The higher investment level and the benefits from the relationship, the more the employee is willing to protest.
To sum up, managerial entrenchment and managers' alliance with employees are not always at a cost of shareholders' value. If incumbent managers can get support for keeping their positions in a good way, like building an employee-friendly relationship, they can get rid of replacement threat without hurting shareholders' value. These insights explain some real world phenomena and contribute to the current research on the labor contracts and corporate control, as well as the employee's role in corporate governance.
My paper is closely related to Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Cespa and Cestone (2004) . Pagano and Volpin analyze the behavior of incumbent manager and employee in a hostile takeover surrounding. They show that if management private benefits are high, managers and workers are natural allies against the takeover threats, since managers are interested in offering long-term labor contracts to employees to make the takeover less attractive and employees act against the efficient raider to protect their high wages. In their model, the incumbent manager and employee gain benefits at the cost of shareholders. On the other hand, Cespa and Cestone consider a situation with weak stakeholder protection. They have found that the managerial entrenchment strategy 4 with social activists, such as building a good relationship with environmental institutions or local unemployment committees, works well for inefficient managers to keep their position. However, if one wants to increase shareholder's welfare, a better stakeholder protection should be introduced. Different to my work, they have focused on the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, like environmental activists and social activists, who do not have any monetary profits from the firm. Another paper discussing the relationships between shareholders, incumbent managers and employees is Hirota and Kawamura (2003) . They find that if there are long-term employee contracts and the effort of young workers depends on managerial decision making, managers can work in shareholders' interests because employees exert implicit pressure on the managers. Hence, the firm can be left as automatically controlled if this mechanism works well.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, I lay out the model and describe the setup in detail. This is followed by an analysis of benchmark case, in which the employee has no influential power, i.e. protesting from the employee is assumed to be impossible. In Section III, I consider the situation 4 Managerial entrenchment is the term used in the literature to indicate the actions taken by the incumbent manager in order to keep his job at firm. Usually, it refers to inefficient management behavior. For example, managers can entrench themselves by setting up good relationships with stakeholders, by signing long-term labor contracts with employees, etc.
where employee protesting is possible, analyze how incumbent manager's and employee's decisions are changing with different effects and study the shareholder's decision on optimal power sharing strategy. Discussions and conclusions are in Section IV. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model

Setup
Consider a static model with a firm, where there is one employee (E). The firm is owned by a shareholder (SH), while it is currently run by an incumbent manager (IM). The shareholder is thinking of replacing the incumbent manager with a better manager (OM) from the outside market. Faced with the replacement risk, the incumbent manager can invest in building a good relationship with the employee in order to get his support. Enjoying the close relationship, the employee may prefer to work with the incument manager in the project. Hence, he would influence the manager replacement decision by protesting for the incumbent manager. The firm's purpose is to develop one project, which will be carried out by the employee and the hired manager. To simplify the model, all agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
Timing
The time schedule of the model is described in Figure 1 . The timeline can be devided to three phases. At the beginning in the setup phase, the shareholder decides the firm's characteristics and the incumbent manager chooses whether to invest in an employee-friendly relationship. At stage 1, the shareholder chooses an optimal power sharing strategy before all the other activities occur. She decides how much influential power she would like to share with the employee in the firm. 5 The power sharing strategy is captured by parameter s. Observing the firm's characteristics set by the shareholder from the first stage, the incumbent manager determines whether to invest in the employee relationship at a cost or not in stage 2. The investment in the relationship is denoted by I. The second phase is the replacement phase, in which the manager replacement decision is made. At stage 3, nature state realizes and with probability π, the shareholder identifies an alternative manager in the outside market, who has a higher ability than the incumbent one. However, this does not necessarily mean that she can replace the incumbent manager as the employee may protest the decision. Knowing his power, manager's investment in the relationship and the replacement probability, at stage 4, the employee decides whether to protest for the incumbent manager at a cost or not. He makes the decision by choosing an optimal protesting effort x. This, together with employee's influential power, determines a successful protesting. In the production phase, a project is carried out. To implement the project, the shareholder will offer wage contracts to both the hired manager and the employee. At stage 5, the shareholder formulates a wage contract with either the incumbent manager or the outside manager depending on the manager replacement result from stage 4. At stage 6, the shareholder writes the employee contract. She offers a take-it-or-leave-it wage contract to employee. Given the wage, the employee chooses the optimal working effort at stage 7. At the last stage, the project is carried out and the payoffs accrue to all the agents. The successful probability of the project is determined by both the ability of hired manager and the effort from the employee.
The Project
The outcome of the project can be good or bad. If it is good, happening with a successful probability q, the project generates a monetary profit of R. Otherwise, the monetary profit will be 0, with a probability of failure of (1 − q). The probability of success depends on the employee's effort e as well as the manager's ability a, the two variables are assumed to be substitute, 6 in particular q = r · (a + e), where r is an exogenous parameter. 7 The firm's revenue only depends on the project's profit. Thus, the firm's expected gross profit is q · R.
The Shareholder
According to the timeline, the shareholder will determine the optimal power sharing strategy with the employee, make manager replacement decision and design the wage contract with the hired manager and the employee.
She decides whether to share part of her power with the employee, by choosing s, where s ∈ [0, +∞). It is a measure of employee's decreasing influential power. The shareholder has all the power over the firm if s → +∞ and the employee has all the power if s = 0. All the other values of s means a shared power between the shareholder and the employee. The influential power held by the employee can affect the successful protesting probability, which will be discussed in detail later.
Moreover, the shareholder decides whether to keep the incumbent manager, with an ability of a IM , at firm or to replace him with a better manager, with an ability of a OM (a OM > a IM ), from the managers' market. She can identify the better manager from the outside market with a probability of π, where π ∈ [0, 1]. 8 It is assumed to be exogenous and cost free.
9
The shareholder also designs the manager contract for the incumbent manager ω IM or for the potential new manager from the outside market ω OM , as well as the employee's contract. 10 Their wage contract will be discussed 6 It can also be assumed to be complement. However with our setup, a complement probability makes employee's choices in protesting effort independent of the difference in managers' ability. In order to test the robustness of the results, I have also tried a combination of substitute and complement production function. The results are similar to the case with substitute production function. 7 The parameter r is assumed to be small enough to ensure q ∈ [0, 1]. 8 The replacement probability π is related to the market status. For example, if there are a lot of capable managers and managers ability is easy to know, it is easier for the shareholder to find the better manager from outside market and π is close to 1. Otherwise, π is low and it is harder for the shareholder to find the better alternative. 9 In a more general set up, the probability π may be a decision variable for the shareholder and may depend on the comparison between the advantages of having a more capable manager and the disadvantages like the searching costs or the costs of firing the incumbent manager. 10 The employee contract is often decided by the manager. Here I assume that the later in detail.
The Manager
The hired manager in the duration of the project receives a wage ω m and enjoys private benefits γ m by controlling the firm, 11 where m can be IM or OM . The private benefits for the incumbent manager, if he is in position, are γ (γ IM = γ), while those for the outside manager are assumed to be 0 (γ OM = 0). 12 Manager's reservation utility (what they can earn at the market) is denoted by U m , with m = IM or OM . With risk neutral preferences, managers are subject to limited liability: their salary can not be negative.
Faced with the replacement attempt and the risk of losing his current job, the incumbent manager can get the support from the employee through investing in a close relationship with him. Incumbent manager's investment in the relationship I IM is equal to I, which is assumed to be discrete, 13 with I ∈ {0, I * }. This investment has a cost for the incumbent manager, which might come from the efforts put on building this relationship, or from the sacrificed control he has. The cost is assumed to be I in order to simplify the calculations. The investment I influences the project process, by reducing the employee's cost of effort. This will be discussed in the next subsection. I assume that building up a close relationship takes time. Hence the outside manager does not have enough time to set up the relationship with employee (I OM = 0). This implies that the employee can enjoy the benefits from the relationship only when he is working with the incumbent manager. Finally the investment I is assumed to be observable but not contractible.
shareholder is in charge of all the contracts, because contracts are verifiable and hence they can be controlled by the shareholder. 11 The parameter γ represents those benefits enjoyed by managers other than wages. They can be monetary or not. Examples for γ might be having a better equipped office, better working welfare, more controlling power, or even the proudness of being a manager, etc.
12 Actually, γ OM can be equal to γ or any other number. Since the outside manager does not make any decision in my model, I can set γ OM to be 0, without influencing the final results. 13 The continuous investment strategy leads to the same static comparative analysis, but the complexity of the functional form does not allow to find a close set solution. Moreover, the numerical example analysis also shows the similar results to that of the discrete investment case.
The Employee
The employee makes two decisions: exerting a non-verifiable effort in the project and choosing the protesting effort for the incumbent manager.
Proceeding by steps, let me first concentrate on the choice of the effort. The employee's effort (e) is a continuous variable and is chosen from the set e ∈ [0, e].
The employee's effort cost is defined as follows:
where κ(
Function κ(I) is a measure of the reduction in employee's working costs, if the manager has made some investment I m in building a close relationship. It is decreasing in I m . Since the outside manager is assumed to have no time to invest (I OM = 0), there is no reduction in the working costs if the employee works with the better manager for the project. In contrast, I IM is decided by the incumbent manager, which may have an effect on employee's working costs if the incumbent manager is responsible for the project.
Employee's wage depends on the only verifiable information, i.e. the result of the project. If the project outcome is R, the employee will be paid a higher wage ω E (R), and otherwise, he gets a lower wage ω E (0). In addition, the employee's wage scheme may depend on which manager he works with. For convenience, let me define:
where ∆ω m is part of the project profit, like a bonus to the employee if the project outcome is good. Therefore, the employee's contract designed by the shareholder includes ω
Note that the agent's contract can depend on I m . Since the employee has a linear utility function, limited liability on the wage is assumed. 
Function g(I m ) is modeled as g(I m ) = g·I m , which is the direct benefits for the employee from the close relationship. It captures benefits enjoyed from the close relationship that are independent of the working effort. Hence, it has a positive effect on the employee's utility.
14 Notice that if the incumbent manager is replaced by the outside manager, the employee will not enjoy those gains by assumption.
The other decision made by the employee is the protesting effort for the incumbent manager. The protesting effort x, with x 0, is assumed to be continuous. I interpret x = 0 as no protesting. The employee protesting succeeds with a probability of
Remember that s is a parameter measuring the decreasing influential power of the employee, which is determined by the shareholder. The success probability is increasing in x and decreasing in s. The more protesting effort and the larger the influential power, the higher is the chance of winning. I assume that employee protests at a cost of x.
The Benchmark With No Employee Protesting
In this section, I study the basic model where there is no employee protesting (that is s = +∞), while the incumbent manager can still decide to invest in an employee close relationship. The timing of the game is similar to that in Figure 1 , just without the stages 1 and 4, and the game will be solved by backward induction.
Design Optimal Employee Contract (stage 7 & 6)
Given incumbent manager's investment I at stage 2 and the managerial replacement result from stage 3, the shareholder needs to offer the employee a contract before the project is carried out. Since the model is solved by backward induction, I start from stage 7, in which the employee chooses his optimal working effort given the wage scheme. This step determines the employee incentive compatibility constraint, because employee's working effort is not observable to the shareholder. At stage 6, the shareholder, as the principal, designs the wage scheme for the employee based on the observable project results 0 and R.
Agent's Decision on Effort:
The employee makes his decision by maximizing his expected utility. Given the contract, he solves:
According to the given wage schemes, the optimal working effort for the employee is
where m = IM or OM , I IM = I and I OM = 0.
Equation (2) implies that it is optimal for the employee to put more working effort when the wage or investment in the close relationship increases.
Employee's Contract:
Expecting employee's optimal working effort, the shareholder at stage 6 determines employee's wage scheme. In the employee contract, the shareholder decides ω m E (0, I m ), ∆ω m (I m ), based on who the manager is and depending on the project result.
At this stage, both the shareholder and the employee know which manager they will work with. The shareholder needs to design the wage schemes such that they are positive (limited liability), and that the employee is willing to take part in the activities (participation constraint), where the reservation utility is assumed to be 0, and to work with effort e * m (incentive compatibility constraint). Thus, the shareholder solves the following problem:
15 It is checked that the second order condition is smaller or equal to 0.
The following lemma states the employee's wage schemes and the optimal working effort.
Lemma 1. The employee's wage scheme is as follows:
and the equilibrium working effort is
Managers' Optimal Contracts (stage 5)
In the previous stage, the shareholder has decided which manager she prefers to hire in order to run the new project, so she designs the managers' contracts at this stage.
Without the employee protesting, whether the incumbent manager will be replaced by a better outside manager or not, is decided by the shareholder. This decision depends on whether she has identified the outside manager in the market at stage 3 and on the cost of each manager. Therefore, it is necessary for the shareholder to know the contract she will offer to the incumbent manager (ω IM ) if the latter succeeds in keeping his position, and to know the contract that will be signed with the new manager (ω OM ) if the incumbent one is replaced. Managers work according to their abilities which are observable. Without loss of generality, the working cost is set to 0 for both managers.
To solve the wage schemes for the managers, I have focused on the following 16 relationship between the limited liability wage ω LL , which is the same for both managers, and the reservation utilities for both IM (U IM ) and OM (U OM ).
Under Assumption 2, the wage schemes and related utilities for both incumbent manager and the outside manager are displayed in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Managers' contract are:
Remember that γ represents the private benefits of working as a manager for the incumbent manager and those for the outside manager are set to be 0. Since γ can be non monetary benefits, such as the proudness of being a controller, enjoyed by the manager in position, the shareholder can not include it in the wage contract. When γ becomes 0, the incumbent manager will be indifferent in staying at the firm or being fired.
Given the employee's and managers' wage schemes defined in Lemma 1 and 2, the expected shareholder value, when she keeps the incumbent manager to carry out the project, is
If the outside manager is found and he is the one hired to run the new project, the shareholder gets
Imagine now that at stage 3, an outside manager is identified. Remember that the incumbent manager's investment in building employee close relationship, I, is either 0 or I * . To have an interesting problem in which the outside manager is preferred to the incumbent one in some cases, consider the situation where IM has no investment in the relationship, I = 0. I assume that in this case, the parameters are such that the shareholder will prefer the more capable outside manager. This is the case if and only if her expected utility with the outside manager (equation 9) is greater than that with the incumbent manager (equation 8). The condition is formally stated in Assumption 3. This assumption is held for the rest of the paper.
Another case appears when even if at the second stage incumbent manager invests (I = I * ), the shareholder still prefers the outside manager. The condition for this case to hold is described in Assumption 4.
Comparing the two assumptions, it is immediate that Assumption 4 implies Assumption 3.
17 Hence, considering these assumptions, two situations can be defined:
18 Case 1. Assumption 4 holds: It implies that no matter whether the incumbent manager invests in the relationship or not, the shareholder always prefers the better alternative manager (OM ). As a consequence, if she can identify the outside manager in the managers market, she would like to replace the incumbent one for sure, which indicates that the incumbent manager will be fired with probability π.
Case 2. Assumption 4 is not satisfied: Then it is possible that the shareholder would prefer the incumbent manager even if she finds the outsider alternative. This is realized when 1 4
where I * should be an implicit function depends on managers' ability (a IM and a OM ), their reservation utility (U IM and U OM ), employee's working cost c and the project result R.
17 This is because
> 0. 18 I haven't considered the case of Assumption 3 failing to hold, since in that case the incumbent manager is always preferred and there will not be replacement threat.
Incumbent Manager's Decision in Entrenchment (stage 2)
Before all the other activities, the incumbent manager needs to decide whether to invest in the employee close relationship or not, with the expectations of future events. His decision depends on his expected payoff, and his payoff is different under those assumptions discussed. Interestingly, even without employee protesting, the incumbent manager is willing to invest in the close relationship under some circumstances. The investment strategy is summarized in the following lemma. (10) is satisfied, the incumbent manager would like to invest in the employee relationship to help him keep the position (I = I * ), when the probability of replacement and the private benefits as a manager are large enough (πγ I * ), and he would rather not invest (I = 0) otherwise.
Conclusions of the Analysis Without Employee Protesting
In this section, I discuss and summarize some interesting results in the circumstance of no employee protesting, based on those calculations in the previous sections. I focus on the analysis of employee's wage scheme and his working effort, and the incumbent manager's investment in the relationship. where m = IM, OM . In this case, both employee's wage scheme and his optimal working effort are dependent of whether he works with the incumbent manager or the alternative manager. Employee's working effort e * m increases in the project return R and decreases in managers' ability a m , implying that he will work harder when the project return is higher or when the manager is less capable. To induce the employee to choose the effort e * m , the contract pays ∆ω m = in case of success. Accordingly, the bonus ∆ω m is increasing with project return R and is decreasing with managers' ability a m .
Furthermore, the informational rent, defined as the difference between expected utility of working and employees' reservation utility, that the em-ployee gets when signing the contract is
which increases in the manager's ability when the following assumption is fulfilled.
Based on Assumption 5, without managerial entrenchment in the close relationship, the employee would rather work with the better alternative manager from the outside market.
With equation (10) and πγ I * , the incumbent manager will invest I * to keep his position at the firm. This, with Lemma 1, implies that
and e *
.
With manager's investment, besides the managers' ability and the project return, the employee's wage and optimal working effort are affected by the investment, as well. Both the working effort e * IM and the bonus ∆ω IM increase in incumbent manager's investment in the relationship. Although the shareholder needs to pay more to the employee with incumbent manager's entrenchment, her expected utility is increasing with the investment because of a higher employee working effort. (Perhaps, a less capable manager is not too bad for the firm as he encourages a higher working effort from the employee!)
In this case, the employee informational rent becomes
It is increasing in the investment level.
As the incumbent manager would entrench himself even without employee protesting, it is interesting to investigate his investing behavior. Reorganizing equation (10) 
Analyzing equation (11), I get the following lemma: Lemma 4. The investment level I * is mainly influenced by two elements: the difference in managers' reservation utilities and in their abilities. Equation (11) is decreasing in the difference in managers' reservation utilities and increasing in the difference of managers' ability. This means that holding everything else constant, if the better alternative is too expensive (the difference between U OM and U IM is very large), the incumbent manager is more willing to invest I = I * in the relationship because the shareholder is less likely to fire him. Similarly, if the outside manager's ability is closer to that of the incumbent one, the manager is also more willing to invest in order to continue working at firm.
From Lemma 3, the incumbent manager will invest I * in the entrenchment to the employee if πγ I * and he invests 0 otherwise, indicating that with no employee protesting, the incumbent manager is willing to invest only when the investment cost I * is relatively low compared with private benefits as a manager. Therefore, when γ is equal to 0, the incumbent manager's utility of staying at firm is the same as that of being fired and he has no incentive to invest in the close relationship with the employee.
Employee Protesting Activity and Managerial Entrenchment
Different from the previous section, now I assume that employee protesting activity is possible. This employee activism enters in the model by reducing the likelihood of incumbent manager's replacement. At stage 2, the incumbent manager tries to entrench himself by building a close relationship with the employee and at stage 4, the employee makes his decision on protesting, given manager's investment and his influential power.
In addition, the measure of decreasing employee influential power s is determined by the shareholder at stage 1. This endogenous parameter s, implying the optimal shareholder-employee power sharing strategy, is modeled by influencing the probability of a successful employee protesting (p) and employee's limited liability wage (equation 6). Therefore, when deciding the optimal employee wage scheme, the shareholder solves the same problem as that of section 2.2.1, except that now the Limited Liability constraint becomes:
In equation (12), f (s) is part of firm's gross profit, which is increasing in employee's influential power. It means that the employee can argue for a higher wage when he has more influential power in the firm. It is a cost for the shareholder when the employee has some influential power. For simplicity, I assume that the limited liability wage is independent of which manager the employee will work with.
19 By straightforward calculation, now the optimal employee's wage scheme is
In this section, I study the optimal power sharing strategy (s) and how the manager's investment behavior will be affected when employee protesting is possible. Note that the analysis of stage 5 to stage 8 are the same as those of the benchmark case. Hence, I will not repeat them here. Therefore, I start the discussion from stage 4 in the timeline.
Employees Activism of Protesting (stage 4)
As discussed in the previous section, I have got different incumbent manager's investment level depending on whether Assumption 4 holds or not. Similar to manager's entrenchment behavior in the benchmark, employee's protesting activity will change under different assumptions. In case 2, where equation 10 holds, the shareholder would not replace the incumbent manager no matter whether she finds the outside manager. Since the incumbent manager can keep his position at firm anyway, there is no need for the employee to protest, i.e. x = 0. This situation is exactly the same as the benchmark case.
As I am interested in investigating manager's and employee's behavior when there is replacement threat, I will concentrate on the complementary situation, i.e. when the shareholder likes to replace the incumbent manager. More precisely, I consider that Assumption 4 holds (Case 1). All the discussions in the rest of the section are done under the assumption.
Remember that the employee protests by choosing a protesting effort x, x 0. The choice of x = 0 is interpreted as a decision of no protesting. Without protesting, the likelihood of replacing the incumbent manager is equal to the probability of identifying the better alternative π. However, if the employee can protest, with a success probability of x x+s , the likelihood of managerial replacement is reduced to π · (1 −
x x+s
).
The employee chooses the protesting effort x by maximizing his expected utility with protesting, which is the solution to the following problem:
where
and
Solving the above problem, the optimal protesting effort for the employee is
Notice that the solution depends on the incumbent manager's investment (I) in the employee close relationship, the difference in managers' ability and the measure of his decreasing influential power (s). On the contrary, if s(F IM (I) + gI − F OM ) − s < 0, then I get a corner solution x * (I, s) = 0, which is the same as the benchmark case. It is possible to have the corner solution when the difference in managers' ability is very large (the incumbent manager is terribly inefficient compared with the outside manager), or when the measure of decreasing employee influential power s becomes very large (the employee has little influence on the shareholder's decision).
Two conclusions can be made from equation (16) and the above analysis, which are shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.
When x
* (I, s) has an interior solution, I is strictly positive (I > 0). This means that when it is optimal for the employee to put positive protesting effort, the incumbent manager must prefer to invest in the employee close relationship. When x * (I, s) has a corner solution (x * (I, s) = 0), I = 0.
2. If incumbent manager's ability a IM is very low compared with the alternative's a OM , or employee influential power is small (s is very large), it is possible for x * to be 0, implying that the employee would like to fire manager with very low ability, even with managerial entrenchment.
The comparative static analysis of x * (I, s) will be discussed in detail after the whole equilibrium of my model is got. Since the corner solution x * (I, s) = 0 repeats the benchmark case, I would like to concentrate on the discussion of interior solution x * (I, s) = s(F IM (I) + gI − F OM )−s. Therefore, assume that s(F IM (I) + gI − F OM ) − s 0 for the rest of Section 3.
When the employee chooses x * (I) = s(F IM (I) + gI − F OM ) − s, his protesting success probability becomes
The success probability becomes greater if the employee's influential power is getting larger (s is smaller) or if the incumbent manager's investment in relationship increases (I is larger).
Incumbent Manager's Investment (stage 2)
Expecting that the employee may protest for him at stage 4, the incumbent manager determines his investment level based on his expected utility. According to the optimal employee protesting effort in equation (16), it is known that the protesting succeeds with a probability of x * (I,s) x * (I,s)+s , indicating that the incumbent manager's opportunity of keeping his job is raised to
). Now the incumbent manager's expected utility becomes
Therefore, the incumbent manager compares his expected utility with I = 0 and that with I = I * :
From the comparison, the incumbent manager will invest in the employee close relationship if and only if the probability of being replaced (π), the private benefits of being a manager at the firm (γ) and the probability of a successful protesting (p) are high enough to cover the investment cost (I * ), i.e.
The comparative static analysis on equation (20) implies the following proposition on incumbent manager's investment behavior. Proposition 1. Holding other effects fixed, the incumbent manager is more willing to invest in the close relationship with the employee, if 1. there is a higher possibility for the shareholder to identify the better alternative manager in the outside market, i.e. the outside manager market is more developed (π is higher);
2. the private benefits of having the position as a manager are higher (γ increases);
3. employee's influential power increases (s decreases);
4. his ability is closer to that of the outside manager (a IM is larger and a OM is smaller);
5. and the close relationship offers higher benefits to the employee (g, h).
The first two arguments in Proposition 1 show that the incumbent manager has a higher willingness to invest in order to get the support from the employee, when the threat he faces of being replaced by another manager is greater and when the attraction of being a manager at the firm is greater. The following three arguments actually indicate how employee's influential power, managers' ability and direct benefits from the relationship affect the successful probability of employee's protesting for the incumbent manager. The third argument describes the positive relationship between employee's influential power and incumbent manager's investment behavior. With s getting larger, the possibility of a successful protesting becomes smaller. Hence, the manager is less willing to invest. Furthermore, according to the argument
Shareholder's Power Sharing Strategy (stage 1)
This is the stage for the shareholder to decide whether she would like to share part of her power at the firm with the employee or not. If she is willing to give out part of the power, what is the optimal power sharing strategy between the shareholder and the employee, i.e. the optimal decision on s? The decision is made at the first stage of the game based on the expectations of incumbent manager's investment strategy and employee's protesting behavior. Therefore, let me analyze the shareholder's strategy when the incumbent manager invests in the relationship (I = I * ) and when he does not invest (I = 0), respectively.
The Optimal Power Sharing Strategy with I = I *
Expecting that it is optimal for the incumbent manager to invest in the employee close relationship (i.e. equation (20) is held), the shareholder decides the optimal power sharing strategy s by solving the following problem:
Solving the above problem and together with equation (16), the optimal power sharing strategy s * and the optimal employee protesting effort x * are concluded in Lemma 6. Lemma 6. Expecting the investment from the incumbent manager, the shareholder is willing to give out part of her power to the employee. It is measured by the decreasing employee influential power:
Given the optimal power sharing strategy and incumbent manager's investment, employee's optimal protesting effort is
The Optimal Power Sharing Strategy with I = 0
At stage 2, the incumbent manager prefers not to invest in the employee close relationship (I = 0), when equation (20) does not hold, i.e.
This, together with the proof of Lemma 6, infers that expecting there is no investment from the incumbent manager at stage 2, it is optimal for the shareholder not to give out any power to the employee. This is the benchmark case, where s * = +∞.
Comparing Shareholder's Expected Utility
Summarizing the results from the above two sections, I find that if at the beginning of the game the shareholder chooses to give out part of her power to the employee (s
2 ), the incumbent manager will invest at I * and the employee will protest for the incumbent manager at (
). However, if the shareholder does not give out her power (s * = 0) at the first stage, the incumbent manager will not invest in the relationship (I = 0) and the employee will not protest (x * = 0).
Therefore, the shareholder needs to determine which is the better choice: sharing the firm with the employee or not, by comparing her expected utility in the two situations. When the shareholder gives out part of her power to the employee, her expected utility with power sharing is:
Otherwise, if the shareholder does not give out any power, her expected utility without power sharing is:
Obviously the shareholder prefers to share the firm with the employee to induce incumbent manager's investment and employee's protesting, if and only if the expected utility with power sharing is larger than that without power sharing. Therefore, equations (22) and (23) imply Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. The shareholder makes decision on whether to share part of her power at the firm with the employee or not, by trading off the savings from the reduction in employee effort cost κ(I * ) with the loss of manager's efficiency, indicated by the difference between manager's ability, and a higher limited liability wage to the employee. If the reduction in the working cost can cover the difference in manager's ability and the increasing employee's limited liability wage, it is optimal for the shareholder to give out part of her power to encourage incumbent manager's investment and employee's protesting.
Conclusions of the Analysis with Employee Protesting
I will do comparative static analysis to study how employee's protesting effort and shareholder's decision on power sharing strategy change with other parameters.
Let me first investigate employee's protesting effort by assuming that it is optimal for the shareholder to give out part of her power to the employee (EV SH (WPS) EV SH (WOPS)). The comparative static analysis on x * in Lemma 6 directly implies proposition 2 on employee protesting activity. Proposition 2. Holding other effects fixed, the employee is more willing to protest so as to preserve the incumbent manager, if 1. the benefits enjoyed from the close relationship with the incumbent manager is larger (g, h);
2. the difference in managers' ability is smaller (a IM is larger and a OM is smaller); 3. and incumbent manager's investment in the relationship increases (I * ), when the threat of being replaced and the private benefits of being a manager are high, or when the difference in managers' ability is not very large.
Proposition 2 has explained employee's protesting decision given his influential power and the incumbent manager's entrenchment. If the employee can enjoy greater benefits from the relationship with the incumbent manager, he will protest with a higher effort to increase the success probability of preserving the manager. The impacts of incumbent manager's ability and outside manager's ability on employee's protesting behavior go in opposite directions. The employee will protest for the incumbent manager if the latter is not too bad and he is less willing to protest when he recognizes that the alternative manager is much better. When the difference in manager's ability is not large, the employee will have more incentive to protest for the incumbent manager when the latter invests more in their close relationship.
Since shareholder's decision on power sharing strategy is crucial for incumbent manager's investment behavior and employee's protesting effort, it is interesting to know how shareholder's decision is influenced. Proposition 3 includes the details. market. This result may explain why the impact of employee on the firm is different across countries. For example, the managers market in US is more developed than that in Europe. Accordingly, we have the observation that it is less common for employees to hold seats on the board in US corporations than in German corporations. Maybe the development of the managers market is one explanation. Moreover, the shareholder prefers to share the power when the incumbent manager is not very inefficient compared with the alternative and when the investment in the relationship is higher.
Once the shareholder decides to share the power with the employee, she will give out the minimum amount, i.e. the largest (s), that is sufficient to encourage the investment from the incumbent manager and protesting from the employee.
Conclusions and Extensions
In the paper I have studied the conflict between inefficient incumbent manager and the owner of the firm, in the situation where incumbent manager can construct a "friendly" relationship with the employee in order to get his support when facing the replacement threat. I have found that the benefits from the incumbent manager's entrenchment (such as enjoying a pleasant working atmosphere, having good cooperation with the manager, etc.), may imply that the employee sometimes would rather work with the inefficient manager by protesting against the shareholder's decision. To some extent, this can be an explanation of the phenomenon why the resigns of managers are followed with employees' quitting.
20 As a result, the inefficient manager can raise the possibility of keeping his position when there is competition from outside managers, through investing in the employee close relationship. Interestingly, such "cooperation" between the incumbent manager and the employee does not necessarily damage the shareholder's welfare. Sometimes, the shareholder would like to share part of her power at firm with the employee to encourage incumbent manager's investment in the relationship and employee's protesting for the manager, because she also gains from the reduction in employee's working costs.
However, the shareholder's decision on power sharing strategy with the employee depends on the tradeoffs between the reduction in employee's effort costs and the loss in manager efficiency, which is measured by the ability difference between the inefficient incumbent manager and the better alternative from the outside market. If the loss overcomes the gains, shareholder's utility will be hurt by the close relationship. She would rather not give out her power to the employee and replace the incumbent manager with a better alternative. Otherwise, she prefers to share the power. The shareholder is more willing to give out part of the power, encouraging the cooperation between the incumbent manager and the employee, when the close relationship generates higher benefits, when there is a lower probability of identifying the better outside manager, when the difference in managers' ability is smaller and when the incumbent manager invests more in the relationship.
Even if there is no employee's protesting, the incumbent manager may find it beneficial to invest in the employee close relationship if the better manager is very expensive or if the managers' ability is similar. This is because in that case, the shareholder will not replace the incumbent manager if the latter invests in the close relationship. With employee's protesting, the incumbent manager would invest if the replacement risk, the private benefits as a manager and the protesting successful probability are high enough to cover the investment costs.
The employee faces a similar problem to that of the shareholder. When the incumbent manager is very inefficient compared with the alternative one, the employee will have a congruent interest with the shareholder. He will not protest for the inefficient manager even with the investment. Therefore, the employee will exert more protesting effort if the difference in managers' ability is smaller and if he enjoys more from the close relationship.
Since the employee plays an important role in the model, it seems natural to ask how the conclusions of my analysis will be influenced if the industrial characteristics, measured by the importance of human capital, is taken into account. Different industries have different level of human capital importance compared with physical assets importance. For example, human capital is more important in the industries of auditing, lawyers, advertising, etc, than that of manufacturing. Therefore, it is interesting to know how the relative importance of human capital will affect the conclusions. Modifying the model described above by introducing the industrial characteristics, I find that the shareholder is more willing to share part of the power with the employee and the incumbent manager is more willing to invest in the re-lationship, if human resource is more important to the firm. 21 The result may be an explanation of why there are more firms controlled by employees in industries of auditing, consulting, etc, than in industries of manufacturing.
Although the model is built to study the conflicts between the shareholder, the owner of the firm, and the manager, the CEO of the firm, the main results got can also be extently applied to the conflicts between the top manager of the firm, the CEO, and the intermediate managers. When an incumbent intermediate manager knows that he is faced with replacement risk, he can lower the firing possibility by building a good relationship with the employees in his team. Since the relationship may reduce employees' working costs and encourage more employees' working effort, it is not bad for the CEO to keep the less efficient intermediate manager at firm. Hence, the results can be applied to all the similar situations.
In the model, the probability that the shareholder successfully identifies the better manager from the outside market depends on the market status (how developed the market for managers is, i.e. are there many capable managers in the market or is it easy to know managers' ability). The results from the model imply that in a less developed market, where π is lower, the shareholder is less willing to give out her power at the firm than in a more developed market. This result may explain why employees in U.S. have less power at firm than those in European countries, like Germany. However, without changing the results, π can also be understood as negatively correlated with incumbent manager's ability (a IM ). The intuition is that when the incumbent manager's ability is relatively high, the probability for identifying a better manager in the market is smaller. One extension of the current model can be endogenizing the replacement probability π. The shareholder chooses optimal replacement probability and the employee decides on the protesting effort simultaneously. The replacement decision can depend on the searching costs for a better manager, the costs of firing the incumbent manager, etc. It would be interesting to investigate how the change will influence the current results in the future study.
1. ω LL < U IM − γ: In this case, the participation constraints are binding for both managers while the limited liability constraints are not. ⇒ ω IM = U IM − γ, and ω OM = U OM .
2. U IM − γ < ω LL < U OM : Now the participation constrain for OM is binding while the limited liability constraint for IM is binding. ⇒ ω IM = ω LL and ω OM = U OM .
3. U OM < ω LL : The limited liability constraints are binding for both managers in this situation. ⇒ ω IM = ω LL and ω OM = ω LL .
The third situation, where the lowest wage is higher than wages sufficient for both managers to take part in the firm, is not an interesting case in my model. Therefore, it will not be included in the discussion. Without the third case, I get ω OM = U OM . The wages in the first situation are similar to ω IM = U IM , and ω OM = U OM if we redefine U IM = U IM − γ, since γ is a constant, which can be ignored. We focus on the second situation, which is just the Assumption 2 in Section 2.3.2. As is known, U IM −γ < U IM < U OM , so it is plausible to set ω LL = U IM . In summary, the wages for managers become ω IM = U IM , and ω OM = U OM .
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. IM decides on I by comparing his expected utility under each alternative.
If Assumption 4 holds, the incumbent manager will be fired when the OM is identified, which happens with probability π. Therefore, if IM does not invest in the relationship, his expected utility would be:
If he chooses to invest at I = I * , then his expected utility becomes:
Comparing equation (27) and (28), the optimal investment strategy for IM is not to invest (I = 0). If only Assumption 3 holds and equation (10) is satisfied, the shareholder will never fire IM if the latter invests I * in the employee close relationship. Hence, IM 's expected utility without investment is:
and the expected utility of investment is:
IM will choose to invest
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5 (1):
if I = 0, the optimal protesting effort becomes 
Proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. Let me define function Y as the difference between shareholder's expected utility with and without power sharing. Reorganizing the function, I have got: 
It is optimal for the shareholder to share her power with the employee if and only if Y 0. According to footnote 16 and Assumption 4,
Therefore, Y 0
Actually the left-hand-side of the above inequality is the savings from employee's working cost reduction and the right-hand-side captures the loss in manager's efficiency and the cost of a higher limited liability wage to the employee.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. i.e. the difference between managers' ability can not be very large.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 7, equation (41) is
The shareholder is willing to give out part of her power to the employee if and only if Y 0. Therefore, to study how other effects influence shareholder's decision, I investigate how function Y will change with other parameters. A larger Y implies a higher possibility for the shareholder to share her power. Taking derivatives, I get: )(rR + a IM · c · κ(I * )) 0.
protesting successful probability. Thus, the protesting success probability becomes: p = l · x l · x + s where ∂p ∂l > 0.
Now the probability of success is increasing in the protesting effort and the relative importance of human resource in the firm. Using equation (56) That is the incumbent manager is more willing to invest in the employee close relationship if human capital is more important to the firm. In addition, at stage 1, if it is beneficial for the shareholder to give out part of the power, the optimal power sharing strategy implies that Comparing the shareholder's expected utility with and without power sharing, and implementing comparative static analysis, I get ∂Y ∂l = − ∂f (s * ) ∂s * · ∂s * ∂l which is greater than 0.
Summarizing the above results, I can conclude that the shareholder is more willing to give out part of her power to the employee if the human capital is more important to the firm.
